IRAN UPDATE

Friday, September 7, 2007

A NEW SHERIFF IN TEHRAN

But Don’t Expect Big Changes From the Islamic Republic

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's wily former president, has seen his share of political ups and downs.  Two summers ago, he lost a race for president against a relative political unknown, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a stunning upset. Now, Rafsanjani is again politically on the rise.

On September 4, the Assembly of Experts formally appointed the 73-year-old Rafsanjani as its chairman. He replaces the Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, a staunch ally of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who led the body for a decade until his death in late July. Rafsanjani—an on-again, off-again rival of Khamenei who already heads the Iranian government's chief arbitration body, the Expediency Council—will now control the political body responsible for vetting the Supreme Leader's conduct, and, potentially, choosing his replacement.

This turn of events marks a serious potential challenge to the authority of the Supreme Leader. On Meshkini's watch, the Assembly served a largely ceremonial function, deferring to Khamenei's ideological and political leadership. But under Rafsanjani, the story could be very different. According to Mehdi Khalaji, an Iranian theological scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Rafsanjani will likely transform the Assembly “from a passive body to a more active body” with greater power in Iranian politics.

Whether the return of Rafsanjani, often label a “moderate” in the West, to the upper echelons of power in Iran will mean a change in direction by the radical regime in Tehran is far less clear, however. Some experts predict that Rafsanjani's rise could lead to a softer, less confrontational foreign policy by the Islamic Republic. “Rafsanjani is very much against having Iran sanctioned and isolated and wants to pursue the nuclear program more slowly, whereas Ahmadinejad is much more reckless,” says Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service.

But those hoping for less terrorism and more cooperation from Tehran on the nuclear front are likely to be sorely disappointed. Rafsanjani, after all, has termed nuclear acquisition an “inalienable right” for his country, and is rumored to have played an important behind-the-scenes role in expanding Iran’s political and strategic influence in neighboring Iraq. Any change in Iran’s behavior, therefore, is likely to be one of tone, and not substance.